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Stated choice surveys may be the most common approach to obtain monetary values of travel 
time. The large surveys of 1988 and 1997 in the Netherlands and of 1994 in the United Kingdom 
produced some puzzling outcomes, such as differences in monetary valuation between travel 
time gains and losses. This has given rise to controversies about the behaviour that might have 
caused this ‘sign effect’, which are not decisively settled. This paper shows that Prospect Theory 
and the heuristic judgment concept as developed in behavioural sciences can shed more light on 
these controversies2. It starts with an introduction of some basic principles of these lines of work 
before re-examining the Dutch and UK surveys from these points of view. It is concluded that the 
sign effect is not caused by biases that stem from heuristic judgment but follows from loss-
aversive valuation of time and money attributes as assumed in Prospect Theory.  
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1. Introduction 
Stated preference (SP) surveys have been conducted in many countries all over the world as an 
important tool to assess the value of travel time savings (VTTS) (e.g. HCG, 1990; Rizzi and 
Ortúzar, 2003). Though such surveys may elicit preferences in different ways, e.g. by 
attractiveness ratings of alternatives or by matching tasks, stated choice surveys are by far the 
most common. A review of the experimental set-up covers studies in seven countries in which 
the core of the survey consists of a series of (mostly bi-optional) choice sets with at least two 
attributes, i.e. trip duration and monetary cost, compared to some reference trip (Burge et al., 
2004). The VTTS is defined in agreement with Utility Theory (UT). It is found by estimating the 
parameters of models in accordance with Random Utility Maximization (RUM) theory that offer 
the best fit with the SP responses. The outcomes of the national Dutch and UK surveys showed 
some anomalies from the perspective of RUM theory. One was that increases in travel time were 
valued higher than decreases of the same size, which Gunn (2001) called the sign effect. This 
occasioned a controversy about the interpretation of the choice behaviour that explains the sign 
effect. While Gunn considered it an expression of genuine preferences, several transport 
                                                        
1 PO Box 5015, 2600 GA, Delft, The Netherlands, T: +31152781144, F: +31152782719, E: e.j.vandekaa@tudelft.nl 
2 This is a revised version of a paper presented at the European Transport Conference (van de Kaa, 2005).  
EJTIR 10(4), December 2010, pp. 347-367 
Van de Kaa 
Sign-dependent Value of Time in Stated Preference: Judgment Bias  
or Exposure of Genuine Preference? 
 
 
348 
researchers thought it was caused by biased judgment induced by the artificial nature of the SP 
setting (e.g. Mackie et al., 2001a). Similar differences in monetary valuation between travel time 
gains and losses were found in several other SP surveys (e.g. Hess et al., 2008) but the discussion 
about its meaning for travel behaviour has not been decisively settled. 
During the past decades Prospect Theory (PT) has been developed (Kahneman and Tversky, 
1979). PT might offer an improved understanding of traveller's choice behaviour (Van de Kaa, 
2010a). Heuristic judgment (see next section) plays a crucial role in the valuation of attributes of 
choice options but may lead to biases (Kahneman, 2002). This paper is aimed to investigate 
whether the sign effect is caused by biases that stem from the heuristic judgment of time and 
money attributes in the SP setting or whether they follow from loss-aversive valuation, as 
assumed in PT. It does not intend to supply improved values for real-life VTTS but proposes 
tools for doing so in the future. Section 2 summarizes some theoretical notions and background 
information that seem relevant in this context. Section 3 reviews the experimental designs, 
analyses and results of the VTTS studies in the UK (1994) and the Netherlands (1988 and 1997) as 
found in the final reports (AMR, 1999; HCG, 1990; 1998) and elsewhere (Bates, 1999; Gunn, 2001; 
Mackie et al., 2001a). In Section 4 these are discussed and re-examined from the perspective of 
heuristic judgment and the basic assumptions of PT, respectively, in connection with a more in-
depth analysis of the results of the Dutch surveys. Section 5 summarizes some conclusions. 
2. Theoretical background 
An SP survey aimed at the assessment of the VTTS presumes that the interviewees value the 
attributes of the submitted choice options as they would in similar real-world choice contexts, 
and choose according to the same principles as in everyday life. For the interpretation of the 
results it is essential to control whether the experimental context might give rise to deviations 
from their commonplace equivalents. As heuristic judgment may cause such deviations this 
section describes its principles and some associated biases. Successively, the VTTS concept, as 
developed within the UT paradigm, is reviewed and defined. Next, relevant basic principles of 
PT as an alternative choice behaviour theory for UT are listed, as some readers may be unfamiliar 
with the former, and the VTTSPT concept3 that follows from them is explained. This section ends 
with some short notes on decision rules and interpersonal heterogeneity in the use of choice 
behaviour strategies. 
In any choice process people may judge attribute characteristics and values immediately, by 
reading them from a stored memory (e.g. one’s body length) or from current experience (e.g. 
liking a cake). Other attributes ‘are routinely evaluated as part of perception and comprehension, 
and therefore always accessible’ (Kahneman and Frederick, 2002, p. 55). Still other attributes are 
accessible only if they have been recently evoked or primed. When an attribute is relatively 
inaccessible it can be substituted by a highly accessible, associatively related heuristic attribute. 
Kahneman and Frederick (2002, p. 53) formally defined heuristics in this sense: ‘judgment is 
mediated by a heuristic when an individual assesses a specified target attribute of a judgment 
object by substituting another property of that object – the heuristic attribute – which comes more 
readily to mind’. Overviews of heuristics can be found in e.g. Gilovich et al. (2002) and Van de 
Kaa (2008). 
When Tversky and Kahneman (1974, p. 1131) first introduced heuristics they concluded: ‘these 
heuristics are highly economical and usually effective, but they lead to systematic and predictable 
errors’. The errors, or biases, are ‘reserved for systematic deviations from normative reasoning 
                                                        
3 To avoid confusion of the VTTS concept according to the UT paradigm with the very similar concept developed 
in agreement with PT the latter is denoted as VTTSPT in this article. 
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and do not refer to transitory processing errors’ (Stanovich and West, 2000, p. 646). In a stated 
choice setting people may, for example, intuitively value a particular attribute as they are used to 
doing in everyday life instead of following some ‘judge as if’ assignment. Such a behaviour is 
similar to the use of the availability and familiarity heuristics (Tversky and Kahneman, 1974; 
Metcalfe et al., 1993) and might bias the interpretation of the inferred VTTS.  
An important bias that may occur in SP surveys is the anchoring bias, caused by salient but 
uninformative numbers in questionnaires. Such highly accessible information may replace more 
appropriate information in the choice subject’s memory as the starting point for the valuation of 
the choice alternatives and attributes. McFadden (2001) reported the occurrence of this bias from 
an SP survey regarding the willingness of several groups of citizens to pay for annually saving 
the lives of 50,000 seabirds. The average of the group that answered an ‘open-ended’ 
questionnaire was $64, those groups that responded to questionnaires containing numerical cues 
ranging from $5 to $400 yielded averages from $20 to $143. Mental inertia in connection with the 
‘fictitious’ SP setting might also have caused biases by inciting interviewees to adopt choice rules 
that they would not consider in a real-life context.  
Based on the first principles of Neoclassical Utility Theory several theories of the value of time 
were developed in the 1960s. The most sophisticated theory (DeSerpa, 1971) considers the value 
of time as the result of the optimisation of time and money resources under a money income 
constraint, a time resource constraint (a day counts no more than 24 hours) and minimum time 
constraints for the consumption of specific goods, like travel. DeSerpa discerns between the value 
of time ‘as a commodity’ used for a particular activity, for example a trip to work, and the value 
of saving time used for that activity. This latter value is what matters in real-life travel behaviour 
and economic analyses. He defines it as the ratio between the marginal utilities4 of saving time in 
a particular activity and the marginal utility of money5. In terms of a subject’s travel and a 
particular currency this yields: 
VTTS = (Monetary) value of travel time savings (€/h) =  
utility of a unit decrease in travel time (-/h) / utility of a unit increase in available money (-/€) 
One of the standard assumptions of Neoclassical economics that was implicitly presupposed by 
DeSerpa (1971) is that the marginal rates of the substitution of goods are the same irrespective of 
the direction of exchange. This implies that, for a reduction in travel time, the VTTS is the same as 
the Willingness-to-pay (WTP), which is the unit increase in money expenses that a subject wants 
to pay for a unit decrease in travel time. It is also equal to the Willingness-to-accept (WTA) a unit 
increase in available money as compensation for accepting a unit increase in travel time, and to 
the exchanges of travel time increases for payment increases. For the general conditional indirect 
utility function that is presupposed in RUM models, Jara-Díaz (e.g. 2002) derived similar findings 
about the VTTS. He thus demonstrated that his ‘subjective value of travel time’6 is the same as the 
VTTS according to DeSerpa (1971). An overview of the development of the travel time theories 
and concepts developed within the UT paradigm can be found in, for example, Mackie et al. 
(2001b), who used the WTP for a reduction in travel time and the subjective value of travel time 
of Jara-Díaz and DeSerpa’s VTTS indiscriminately. To avoid confusion with the value of travel 
time as a commodity as discussed by DeSerpa (1971) and others, this article will use VTTS to 
denote these concepts, including the WTA for an increase in travel time. 
                                                        
4 The marginal utility of a good is the additional utility derived from a unit increase in the possession of it. 
5 In agreement with neoclassical UT DeSerpa (1971) and later scientists who studied the value of travel time 
savings assumed the same marginal utility of available money for all feasible goods/activities including travel. 
6 If a RUM model with linear travel time and cost specification describes observed behaviour well this value is 
equal to the ratio between the travel time and cost coefficients (Jara-Díaz, 2002). 
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The current state-of-practice in the assessment of VTTS from SP surveys is to ask the interviewees 
to report the characteristics of a concrete trip that they made recently. Based on this reported real-
life trip the attributes of a series of choice sets (mostly bi- or tri-optional) are designed by varying 
the duration and cost of the real-life trip and/or components of these. Often the real-life trip is 
one of the alternatives in some or even all choice sets. The interviewees are asked to choose the 
preferred alternative from each choice set of the series. The parameters of a best fitting RUM 
model with linear-additive utility specification, nowadays often of the Mixed Multinomial Logit 
type, are estimated. The ratio between the travel time and travel cost coefficients yields the VTTS 
and/or the value of savings in particular travel time components. One should note that, if the 
interviewees chose according to the choice behaviour strategy7 on which the theoretical 
developments of DeSerpa (1971), Jara-Díaz (2002) and others are built, this yields just one VTTS 
value that is the same for travel time decreases and increases. Thus, if the assessed VTTS differs 
significantly depending on whether decreases or increases in travel time are considered their 
choice behaviour strategy was not in agreement with UT’s assumptions. 
Kahneman and Tversky (1979, p. 274-284) posited PT against Expected Utility Theory as a set of 
generic assumptions that ‘presents an alternative account of individual decision making under 
risk’. They defined prospects as alternatives characterized by a probability distribution of 
outcomes, where the sum of the probabilities is unity. PT assumes that subjects first frame their 
choice context, particularly by coding the perceived prospects as gains and losses relative to a 
reference state, rather than considering the expected state of them as presumed in UT. 
Successively each prospect is valued by applying a value function to the different expected 
outcomes (or attribute levels), multiplying these with a corresponding weighted probability and 
adding the products to arrive at an overall expected value, after which the prospect with the 
highest expected value is chosen. As the decision frame that a subject adopts depends on her 
personal circumstances and the choice context, including the way choice options are presented 
and/or perceived, her preference order is thus also context-dependent.  
The shape of the value function in the loss domain differs strongly from that in the gain domain. 
Firstly, PT assumes that people value losses much higher than gains of equivalent size. Tversky 
and Kahneman characterized this difference with the loss aversion factor8 λ. It may differ 
between attributes of the same choice set. Secondly, PT assumes diminishing sensitivity, that is: 
the marginal value of both gains and losses generally decreases with their magnitude. This 
implies that the value function is convex for losses and concave for gains. As this paper does not 
consider the choice between alternatives with a probability distribution of outcomes PT’s 
weighted probability function is not considered here. 
PT was originally developed for prospects with mono-attribute outcomes but Kahneman and 
Tversky (1979) included outcomes with 100% probability under their prospect concept. Thaler 
(1980) already applied PT – under that designation – to the choice between alternatives with 
certain outcomes. Kahneman and Tversky (1984, p. 346, 349) proposed that ‘in order to evaluate a 
multi-attribute option … the overall value of an option is given by the balance of its advantages 
and its disadvantages in relation to a multi-attribute reference state’ and defined this overall 
decision value as ‘the contribution of an anticipated outcome to the overall attractiveness or 
                                                        
7 An individual’s choice behaviour strategy is the combination of the framing, attribute judgment, evaluation and 
choice rules that she employs in a choice context (Payne et al., 1993; Van de Kaa 2010b). The choice behaviour 
strategy adopted by DeSerpa (1971) presupposes that each individual considers all feasible alternative activities, 
attaches the same marginal utilities to increases and decreases in attribute levels, treats all feasible money 
earnings and money expenses as fungible and chooses the alternative that maximizes her utility within time and 
money constraints.  
8 The loss aversion factor λ is defined as the ratio between the decision values of a unit decrease in the level of a 
positively valued attribute of a choice alternative and a unit increase in that level, with λ ≥ 1.0. 
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aversiveness of an option in a choice’. They suggested a context-dependent, subjective attribute 
value assessment by intuitive processes in which the hedonic appraisals of former activities may 
play a decisive role, although a trade-off between the decision values of all feasible alternative 
time and money spendings seems unlikely. For the decision value of money they adopted 
‘mental accounting’ as proposed by Thaler (1980), which implies that the decision value of money 
may differ between activities and contexts. Later, Tversky and Kahneman (1991) elaborated the 
applicability of PT to choice contexts with ‘certain’ two-attribute outcomes, without extending its 
constituent assumptions, as a reference-dependent model9. As the trip alternatives that were 
submitted to the interviewees in the Dutch and UK SP surveys were characterized by two 
attributes, travel time and travel cost, this paper follows their 1991 elaboration of PT closely.  
In this article the VTTSPT in agreement with PT is defined analogous to DeSerpa (1971). That the 
decision value of money may differ between activities is taken into account. It also considers that 
different people may treat travel cost increases either loss aversively or loss neutrally (see e.g. 
Kahneman and Tversky 1984). This implies that the VTTSPT is defined as:  
VTTSPT = (Monetary) value of travel time savings (€/h) = 
(Decision) value of a unit decrease in travel time (-/h) / 
              (Decision) value of a unit decrease in monetary travel expenses (-/€) 
In connection with different loss aversion factors for time and money this yields:  
WTP for a reduction in travel time     = VTTSPT / λcost  
WTA for an increase in travel time      = VTTSPT * λtime  
Ratio of the value of a unit increase in travel time to that in cost  = λtime * VTTSPT / λcost  
PT suggests a compensatory decision rule to wind up the choice process (Kahneman and 
Tversky, 1979, 1984). Compensatory rules compound overall values for each alternative and 
compare these. The weighted linear additive value rule is the most commonly accepted one in 
both UT and PT. It presumes that the choice subjects add up the values that they assigned to the 
different attributes of alternatives, after multiplication of each value with a corresponding 
subjective attribute decision weight (Payne et al., 1993). For most VTTS surveys the interviewees 
are supposed to assign a monetary value to travel time variations and thus include the subjective 
attribute decision weight in their VTTS judgment. One should note that if either travel time or 
travel expenses are valued much higher than the other attribute, the so-called non-compensatory 
strong lexicographic rule becomes descriptively indiscernible from a linear additive value rule.  
Non-compensatory rules compare the alternatives attribute-wise. Presumably the most common 
non-compensatory strategy in consumer behaviour is a two-stage process where an aspect-based 
elimination rule is followed by a compensatory rule (e.g. Cantillo and Ortúzar, 2005). In decision 
theory, many compensatory and non-compensatory decision rules are reported that people may 
use (overviews e.g. in Van de Kaa, 2008; 2010b). For the analysis of choice processes that follow 
the principles of PT it is assumed here that during successive choices in the same domain-context 
combination most people consistently use just one of the choice behaviour strategies from their 
‘toolbox’ (Payne et al., 1993). This may be considered as a weak substitute for the concept of the 
complete, transitive and context-independent idiosyncratic preference order of UT. 
                                                        
9 Since then, such applications might be encountered under the name of PT (e.g. List, 2004) and/or Reference-
dependent theory (e.g. De Borger and Fosgerau, 2008). 
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3. A review of the Dutch and UK national VTTS surveys 
Between 1988 and 1997 three large-scale SP surveys to assess the VTTS were performed, two in 
the Netherlands and one in the UK. The experimental design of the three surveys was 
remarkably similar. The final report of the oldest Dutch study (HCG, 1990) contains a description 
of the experimental design, including examples of the questionnaires employed. For the Dutch 
1997 study the 1988-design was replicated almost exactly (HCG, 1998). 
The researchers did not aspire to surveying a representative sample of the population. The 
survey panel members were recruited while they were ‘on their way’ for business, commuting or 
other purposes. They were asked on the spot to answer questions about their actual trip 
(including origin-destination, motive, expected travel time). If they were willing to participate in 
a postal survey they were sent a questionnaire. The first section of the questionnaires asked 
evaluative information about the previous trip (e.g. refund of costs, delays, arrival time). The 
final section comprised questions concerning personal and household characteristics like gender, 
age, employment and income. In between was the SP game that contained twelve bi-optional 
choice sets with time-cost trade-off SP questions. The submitted alternatives were retrospective, 
using the actual trip the respondent was undertaking at the time of the recruitment interview as a 
reference. Four choice sets contained the reference trip and either a time loss/money gain or time 
gain/money loss alternative; one set contained a dominant alternative, added to check for the 
interviewees’ understanding of the questionnaire. There were different questionnaires for four 
reference trip duration classes. Table 1 shows the nominal values of the submitted monetary and 
time losses and gains. These were the same in both surveys. 
The 1994 British study essentially followed the same experimental design as the Dutch surveys 
(AMR, 1999). Public transport passengers were not surveyed. The reference trip duration bands 
were smaller than in the Dutch surveys and the submitted trip duration and cost variations 
differed accordingly. 11 Distinct sets of choice sets were submitted. Each questionnaire contained 
eight different bi-optional comparisons. Four of these compared the reference trip with either a 
time gain/cost loss or time loss/cost gain alternative. In the other four comparisons the 
difference in either the cost or the time from the reference trip was set at zero in all eight 
alternatives; here either a time gain was traded against a monetary gain, or a time loss against a 
monetary loss (Bates, 1999). 
Table 1. Submitted trip duration and cost variations, Dutch VTTS studies 
Reference trip duration 
(minutes) 
Trip duration variations 
(minutes) 
Trip cost variations 
(guilders,- means increase, + decrease) 
< 45 -10;    -5;  0;    5;  10 11 values     from   -3.0 to +1.5 
46-90 -10;  -20;  0;  10;  20 11 values     from   -6.0 to +3.0 
91-135 -15;  -30;  0;  15;  30 11 values     from   -9.0 to +4.5 
>135 -20;  -40;  0;  20;  40 11 values     from -12.0 to +6.0 
Source: final reports of the Dutch VTTS- surveys (HCG, 1990; 1998) 
 
All the analyses of these surveys that have been reported to date have presumed that the choice 
behaviour of the interviewees complied with the premises of UT; see e.g. AMR (1999, p. 5). Logit 
models were used for the analyses. The utility of each option was calculated based on the cost 
and time differences with respect to the reference trip, with household income, journey purpose 
etc. as explanatory variables. The Dutch studies attributed the same weight to increases and 
reductions in cost and time relative to the reference option. The models used in the UK survey 
discerned increases and decreases of time and cost with respect to the reference as well. This 
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resulted in a much better model fit than that for a simple model using only time and cost as 
variables (AMR, 1999, p. 162).  
The first Dutch SP survey found greatly differing values for the average VTTS depending on trip 
motive and travel mode (HCG, 1990, p. 23). Inflated to the 2005 price level and converted to € the 
range was between €5.2/h for ‘other’ purposes and €12.7/h for business, and from €4.4/h for bus 
and tram passengers to €9.4/h for car drivers. Though the survey panel was not a representative 
sample of the Dutch population the findings are obviously indicative of roughly corresponding 
real-life differences. Some more significant relationships: for all purposes and travel modes VTTS 
increased systematically with income and with a decrease in personal ‘free time’; and the VTTS of 
young commuters and business travellers was much higher than average while that of elderly 
people was below average. As far as corresponding figures could be retrieved from revealed 
preference surveys these confirmed this pattern and were of the same order-of-magnitude. The 
second Dutch survey (HCG, 1998) and the UK study (AMR, 1999) found a similar variation in 
VTTS, dependent on trip purpose, income, age group and travel mode (Dutch survey only).  
The final report of the Dutch 1988 study mentions: ‘there was strong evidence that travellers 
value time savings at a much lower rate than time losses. For commuters, in particular, losses 
were valued around 50% higher than average, and savings around 50% lower’ (HCG, 1990, p. 21). 
So far, the only additional quantitative information on this aspect was published in Gunn (2001, 
p. 181). Similar results from the UK survey are tabulated in AMR (1999, p. 181), preceded by a 
thorough description of the model used for the analysis. 
The available data were inflated, adapted to present-day currency and are presented in Figure 1. 
This demonstrates the difference in the valuation of gains and losses: ‘Our results … confirm that 
time losses are valued, per unit, significantly higher than time savings’ (AMR, 1999, p. 29). It also 
shows that the VTTS for large time changes is higher than for small ones. Averaging the 
outcomes of different trip duration classes might have suggested the high loss aversion ratio (λtime 
≈ 3.0) that HCG found for Dutch commuters in 1988, see citation above.  
Figure 1. Sign and size dependency of the VTTS 
 
Bates (1999) re-analysed the data of the UK study as reported in AMR (1999) on size and sign 
effects averaged over all trip purposes. Later on, his analyses were refined, differentiating 
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between business trips, commuting and other travel purposes (Mackie et al., 2001a). Both studies 
mapped the choice sets of the SP game on a coordinate system with the reference trip as origin 
and the time and monetary cost increases on the horizontal and vertical axis, respectively. Figure 
2 illustrates this concept after transformation into an indifference map as common in Neoclassical 
UT, with discretionary disposable money, or time, for ‘other’ purposes on the vertical and 
horizontal axis, respectively. From this it is clear that Bates (1999) and Mackie et al. (2001a) 
presumed a strict independence of both the size of duration and the cost of the reference trip and 
the size of the evaluated cost and time changes. Furthermore they assumed random interpersonal 
variations in attribute valuation between the interviewees who were presumed to value trip 
duration and money expenses according to UT. 
Bates (1999) had only the percentages of the respondents that chose the first or second option 
from each of the UK choice sets at his disposal. Treating these percentages as expected choice 
probabilities he calculated the logit values for each of these 88 choice sets. He also plotted these 
logit values against the ‘boundary values of time’, that are the values of time for which both 
alternatives should be equally attractive. From this plot Bates concluded that the VTTS was very 
high in quadrant 2, very low in quadrant 4 and broadly similar in quadrants 1 and 3. However, a 
rough estimate of the ‘average’ VTTS in each quadrant may be found at the intersection of the 
regression curve through the concerned logit values and the ‘boundary value’ axis. A secondary 
analysis using a linear regression showed that the VTTS in quadrant 3 was more than twice the 
value in quadrant 1.  
Figure 2. Time-money indifference map and trip costs 
 
Using standard linear regression Bates also estimated the cost and travel time parameters of a 
simple binomial logit model with linear utility specification that offered the best fit with the 88 
calculated logit values. Mackie et al. (2001a) estimated a similar model for the disaggregate 
responses, after splitting them up according to quadrant and trip purpose. The different VTTS 
values10 are listed in Table 2. The findings from the different models reflect the same dependency. 
Averaging the VTTS in quadrant 1 and 2 (time losses) and 3 and 4 (time gains) yields the same 
orders-of-magnitude as the mean values in Figure 1.  
                                                        
10 These and all other monetary values from the 1994 UK survey are inflated and converted to € in this article. 
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Table 2. Sign dependent VTTS from responses to the UK 1994 Stated Choice survey 
Average VTTS in €/h in quadrant 1 2 3 4 
Based on Bates (1999), estimates from aggregated choice frequencies of 88 choice sets, all trip purposes 
From secondary analysis of logit values plot (p.323)  4.7 15.8 9.4 -1.7 
From estimated cost and travel time parameters (p.308) 5.9 15.8 8.7 -0.1 
Based on Mackie et al. (2001a), from estimated cost and travel time parameters in binary logit models  
VTTS per quadrant for business trips 10.4 25.1 13.4 5.5 
VTTS per quadrant for commuting 5.3 13.3 4.3 1.7 
VTTS per quadrant for other trips 5.2 12.9 3.8 1.5 
Aggregated responses to UK survey, VTTS inflated, rounded off and converted to 2005 price level in €/h  
 
Mackie et al. (2001a) showed that the differences in the VTTS between quadrants 2 and 4 
disappeared when an inertia term was introduced in the models. This persuaded the authors to 
conclude that ‘there is no justification for valuing time gains at different unit rates from time 
losses’ (Mackie et al., 2001a, Conclusions). Thus they rejected the conclusion of AMR (1999, p. 9) 
that ‘for any level of variation around the original journey time, gains (savings) are valued less 
than losses’. Using these models including inertia terms Mackie et al. (2001a, Sect. 2.2) found ‘that 
the unit values of small time savings come out very different from large’ but concluded ‘Our 
feeling is that the lower values for the small time changes arise because of the artificial nature of 
SP exercises’. 
4. The sign effect re-examined from the perspectives of heuristic judgment 
and Prospect Theory 
Based on the theoretical concepts presented in Section 2, the information contained in the reports 
of the Dutch and UK studies and in the articles of Bates (1999), Gunn (2001) and Mackie et al. 
(2001a) was re-examined for the conceivable occurrence of biases induced by the experimental 
design and for the likelihood of sign-dependency of VTTS. The RWS Centre for Transport and 
Navigation also made the full documentation of both Dutch surveys available, including the 
tabulated responses of the individual interviewees. These were excellently filed away and saved 
by HCG’s successor, Significance. Some findings from these data are presented here as well. To 
facilitate the comparison with the UK survey the responses of Dutch public transport users are 
disregarded here.  
4.1 Hedonic framing of the questionnaire 
Several aspects of the experimental designs are well in line with premises from PT. The ‘reference 
state’ was clearly circumscribed in the questionnaire and embedded in a recently experienced 
real-life trip taken by the survey subjects. In case this was a trip during working hours and/or 
paid for by the employer participants were explicitly instructed to consider these as made in their 
own discretionary time and at their own expense. This, combined with the general propensity of 
interviewees to take the wording of questionnaires for granted (Kahneman, 2002, p. 458) leaves 
little doubt that most people framed trip time and cost reductions as gains and increases as 
losses.  
However, as Thaler (1999) mentioned, people are inclined to frame the outcomes of alternatives 
in such a way that they promote their interests or happiness as much as possible. People whose 
travel expenses are reimbursed might apply this ‘hedonic framing’ principle by treating all cost 
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changes as loss-neutral, or might even value any cost changes as negligible. One might observe 
that such behaviour would be consistent with premises of both PT and UT because the changes in 
trip expenditures would not alter the money available for ‘other’ expenses. The ‘rational’ decision 
weight for the cost attribute should therefore be zero. Another way to arrive at the same choice 
behaviour is related to the availability and/or cue familiarity heuristic (Tversky and Kahneman, 
1974; Metcalfe et al., 1993): when answering the SP game, reimbursed travellers may 
unconsciously appraise the alternatives as they are used to do in everyday life and forget that 
they were committed to replying ‘as if’ the trip costs were not compensated. Both hedonic 
framing and application of this judgment heuristic would result in the same choice behaviour as 
caused by the application of a strong lexicographic decision rule, here by selecting the alternative 
with the lowest trip time from any choice set.  
In the Dutch survey from 1997, 49% of the car drivers stated that the reference trip costs were 
completely compensated. The individual responses to the choice sets showed that about 14% 
systematically chose the alternative with the lowest travel time, quite comparable to the 
percentages reported from three-attribute experiments in Chile (Rizzi and Ortúzar, 2003). This 
percentage rose to 19% for people whose expenses were reimbursed. Two-thirds of these ‘strong 
lexicographic’ choosers got their reference trip expenses reimbursed while only 14% of them got 
no compensation; the remaining interviewees got a partial reimbursement. Complete 
reimbursement applied to most business travellers (72%) and many commuters (41%) but to only 
19% of the ‘other’ travellers. In view of the distribution of reimbursement over the different trip 
purposes the associated difference in the frequency of lexicographic answers might partly explain 
the trip purpose dependency of VTTS as observed in the UK and Dutch surveys. Both for 
completely reimbursed and not-reimbursed trips the percentage of business travellers that 
systematically chose the alternative with the lowest travel time (23% and 17%) was well above 
that for commuters (18% and 9%) and other travellers (14% and 4%). This bias, therefore, 
definitely does not annihilate the purpose dependency of the VTTS. Closer examination of the 
Dutch results showed that the percentage of interviewees who systematically chose the fastest 
alternative varied strongly with income. Taking into account this distribution over 
reimbursement category, trip purpose and income class, this bias might cause an overestimation 
of lexicographic answering by about 1.5% of the survey population, which might have inflated 
the average VTTS by a few percent.  
The preference order found from lexicographic answering does not depend on differences in 
appraisals of gains and losses. This bias does therefore not contribute to the sign effect. Two 
choice sets the UK and Dutch SP games compared the ‘no change’ alternative with a travel time 
gain and two others compared is with an increase. This bias might thus have underestimated the 
number of respondents who systematically choose the ‘status quo’ alternatives.  
In the Dutch surveys, hedonic framing and/or the employment of judgment rules related to the 
availability and cue familiarity heuristics might have biased the VTTS of travellers who received 
reimbursement for their trip. It may have overestimated the VTTS with a few percent at most. In 
future surveys one might arrange for a sample with sufficient numbers of reimbursed and not-
reimbursed travellers in the relevant trip categories to control for such a bias in the VTTS.  
4.2 The anchoring bias 
Dutch travellers are hardly ever confronted with operational time-money trade-off decisions. 
Thus many interviewees may have found it difficult to map values of time on a monetary scale, 
even when they were well aware of the context-dependent individual decision value that they 
attribute to travel time gains and losses. This may imply that an anchoring-and-adjustment 
heuristic was used to arrive at a judgment of the monetary value.  
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The introduction to the SP game in the Dutch 1988 survey contained an example of the choice sets 
with instructions for completion. Some of the interviewees might have used the boundary VTTS 
in this example as the ‘anchor’ for an adjustment of the valuation in the appropriate direction. 
However, such ‘adjustments tend to be insufficient, leaving people’s final estimates biased 
towards the initial anchor value’ (Epley and Gilovich, 2002, p. 139; see also the findings of 
McFadden referred to in Section 2). For the 1988 survey this anchor was €3.8/h, almost the same 
as the VTTS found from revealed preference analyses for ‘other’ trip purposes and well below the 
VTTS revealed from real-life commuting and business trips. An anchoring bias would thus imply 
that the VTTS values of business travellers and, to a lesser extent, commuters as found in the 1988 
SP survey should be well below those found from revealed preference surveys. The average 
revealed preference data reported in HCG (1990) show this pattern indeed but as the SP values 
are within the 95% confidence interval of the revealed data this comparison does not offer solid 
proof for the occurrence of an anchoring bias. 
The cost attributes in the example and the 12 choice sets submitted in the 1997 Dutch survey had 
the same nominal values in guilders as in the 1988 survey. Meanwhile the consumer price index 
of the Dutch households rose by 25% and their purchasing power improved by 7%11. One would 
thus expect that the nominal VTTS would increase by at least 25%. Gunn (2001) found that the 
1997 VTTS lagged 6.5% (business), 10.3% (commuting) and 9.5% (other) behind inflation. After 
expansion of the survey results to the Dutch population and correction for inflation HCG (1998) 
found changes in VTTS levels that differed strongly depending on the considered segmentations. 
They reported an average increase of 33% for the employees’ VTTS for business trips, a 5% 
increase for commuting and a 9% decrease for other trip purposes. An anchoring bias would 
imply that the increase over time of the VTTS is smaller for business travellers and, to a lesser 
extent, for commuters than for other travellers. Thus neither the results of Gunn (2001) nor these 
of HCG (1998) can be explained by such a bias. 
In sum, though the Dutch SP questionnaires provided a highly accessible anchor no solid 
evidence was found that the answers were affected by an anchoring bias.  
4.3 The inertia bias 
When people stick to their earlier behaviour social scientists often denote and/or explain this as 
(mental) inertia. Except for common language definitions like ‘disinclination to act or exert 
oneself’ (Shorter Oxford English Dictionary) no covering definition was found for the different 
concepts used by social sciences. The real-life examples of inertia that Thaler and Sunstein (2009) 
put on the stage include, for example, the disregarding or omitting of choice opportunities, 
postponing or abandoning of intended choice processes and/or the implementation of earlier 
decisions, and accepting default alternatives and/or default settings of products. Where they 
describe concrete choices Thaler and Sunstein (2009, p. 37) mention loss aversion as an 
explanation for inertia referred to as ‘a strong desire to stick with your current holdings’. In SP 
surveys inertia might thus cause non-response by interviewees who earlier agreed to respond, 
omitting the completion of parts of the questionnaire by those who responded, application of a 
‘random decision rule’ and the choice of the ‘no change’ alternatives where possible as a 
consequence of loss aversion. 
Based on analyses of the UK survey outcomes Bates (1999) and Mackie et al. (2001a) claimed that 
approximately the same values for time gains and losses of equivalent size could be found by 
introducing an inertia variable. It is obvious that such an inertia variable or status quo bias will 
be significant if many respondents exhibited loss aversion, see e.g. Van de Kaa (2010b). However, 
                                                        
11 See Statistics Netherlands website. During the considered period inflation was about the same for all income 
categories whereas the increase in purchasing power varied over the deciles between 3% and 9%.  
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the authors posited that the inertia effect was a consequence of the experimental setting: ‘inertia 
is a preference for the current situation in order to simplify the task of answering the SP 
questions’ (Mackie et al., 2001a, Sect. 2.1). In this paper this behaviour is denoted as the inertia 
bias, to discern it from the more general concept of inertia.  
Obviously, Bates (1999) and Mackie et al. (2001a) presumed that the interviewees would 
consistently have followed utility maximization principles for their choices if they had not 
bothered about the compensatory calculations and comparisons of overall utility. The responses 
to the Dutch surveys make it possible to put this premise to a severe test. These responses were 
analysed under the premise that most people consistently use one choice behaviour strategy 
during successive choices in the same particular domain-context combination. This seems the 
least one might expect from any interviewee who demonstrated inertia as a deviation from 
common utility maximizing behaviour, as it is only a weak substitute for the complete, transitive 
and context-independent idiosyncratic preference order of UT.  
After exclusion of respondents from the 1988 and 1997 surveys who did not complete all four SP 
questions that contained the ‘status quo’ alternative, 4035 car-driving respondents remained. Of 
these, 1247 (31%) consistently chose for the reference state whenever it occurred in the choice set. 
If this choice was the consequence of an inertia bias of utility-maximizing interviewees there were 
three options when dealing with the eight remaining SP questions: 
-Leave these unanswered.  
-Answer them randomly, or in a fixed order.  
-Evaluate them in the compensatory way.  
Sub (i): Seven respondents left these uncompleted and 23 more did not choose from at least four 
choice sets. Though the inertia bias may have caused the choice behaviour of these respondents it 
might just as well have been caused by unwillingness to choose any alternative implying a loss. 
Sub (ii): No respondents were found who followed some ‘fixed order’ response (like A-B-A-B-A-
B…). Amongst the responses were 46 unique sequences. Ten different sequences were chosen 
twice and four sequences threefold. All other sequences observed were chosen by at least four 
interviewees. It is easy to see that the chance that an individual selects a particular sequence of 
eight bi-optional choices is 0.58 ≈ 0.004 if the response to these eight questions is random. The 
chance that any particular sequence is chosen by two or more random choosers rapidly decreases 
and drops to virtually zero for four identical sequences. At most a part of the twice and threefold 
chosen sequences might thus be a consequence of random choice, implicating that less than about 
70 respondents might have followed this strategy. Random choice also implies that the dominant 
and inferior alternative from a choice set should be chosen with about the same frequency. As 20 
out of the 46 ‘unique’ choice sequences, three out of the ten twin sequences and two of the four 
threefold chosen sequences contained the inferior alternative this supports the notion that at most 
some 70 interviewees concluded their choice for the status quo with a random choice from the 
other choice sets. Random mistakes and estimation errors by respondents who, apart from that, 
exhibited a loss-aversive choice behaviour strategy offer an alternative explication for most of 
these sequences. One should further consider that a significant number of respondents might 
have marked the status quo alternatives as a consequence of applying the random choice rule 
rather than deliberately exhibiting an inertia bias.  
Sub (iii): UT could explain the eight ‘other’ choices of 338 respondents. Loss aversive appraisal of 
the ‘other’ choice sets, in agreement with PT, could explain 346 more responses that definitely 
violated UT principles as well as all but one of the 338 responses in agreement with UT. Nineteen 
respondents systematically selected the alternative with the lowest trip costs, and 35 more the 
one with the shortest duration. One cannot exclude the possibility that the application by some of 
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these ‘status quo’ choosers of these simple lexicographic decision rules for the remaining choices 
is indicative of an inertia bias. However, a non-compensatory two-stage strategy starting with a 
conjunctive rule drawing on loss aversion, resulting in an empty choice set, followed by a re-
evaluation of the initially rejected options with a lexicographic decision rule would do the same 
job, for example.  
Summarizing, inertia presumably explains a part of both the non-response to any SP survey and 
the incomplete answering of the SP game. If incomplete records are disregarded and the survey 
results are properly expanded to the population level, as was done in the considered surveys, this 
will not bias the inferred VTTS. In the Dutch surveys 1247 respondents (31%) systematically 
chose the ‘status quo’ alternative from the four SP questions that contained them. The other 
choices of most of these respondents agreed with a consistent application of PT, UT or several 
well-documented non-compensatory strategies to all 12 SP questions. At most some 5% to 10% of 
these 1250 respondents completed the other eight SP questions in a way that might be consistent 
with an inertia bias. An inertia bias of utility-maximizing interviewees could thus have played a 
role in a few percent of all responses but the extent is too small to exert a more than marginal 
effect on the VTTS assessment. In the Dutch surveys it could definitely not explain the observed 
choice behaviour of most respondents who systematically chose the reference option. Their 
behaviour might thus be considered as genuine expressions of preferences that are consistent 
with their real-life travel choice behaviour. 
4.4 Loss aversion in agreement with Prospect Theory 
From the preceding sections it seems obvious that the difference in valuation between travel time 
savings and losses as observed in Figure 1 might be attributed to the loss aversion principle of 
PT. Figure 3 shows the corresponding λtime values for different time changes. Except for low time 
changes the ratios are mostly in the range of 1.4 to 2.2, slightly lower than the 2.0 to 2.5 values 
reported by Kahneman (2002). 
Often the loss aversion factor is presumed to be the same for both time and cost attributes. 
However, PT allows for different values of the loss aversion factor for different attributes. 
Tversky and Kahneman (1991, p. 1051) illustrated this with an indifference map in which the 
indifference curves were linearized and the loss aversion for both considered attributes differed. 
Figure 4 shows a similar indifference map with the trip expenses and trip duration as dimensions 
of the choice options and the reference trip duration and cost as reference state. It includes the 
coordinate system and quadrants as defined by Bates (1999) and Mackie et al. (2001a), see Figure 
2 above. As an example, the loss aversion factor for time (λtime = 2.5) was assumed to be well 
above that for monetary cost (λcost = 1.5). According to the principle of indifference maps the 
VTTS in the quadrants is equal to the negative slope of the indifference curves there. Figure 4 
shows that the slope of the indifference curve in quadrant 1 is steeper than in quadrant 3 if λtime > 
λcost and thus the VTTS is higher. When λtime < λcost the slope is feebler in quadrant 3 and thus the 
VTTS is lower. Obviously, the slope and VTTS in quadrant 1 and 3 are the same if λtime = λcost. 
Figure 4 thus relates the VTTS values per quadrant in Table 2 to VTTSPT, λtime and λcost values as 
defined in agreement with PT. The best fitting values of the latter parameters were assessed by 
linear regression of the implied VTTS values per quadrant and the corresponding values in Table 
2. The results are listed in Table 3, together with the coefficients of determination which 
demonstrate a good fit. As neither Bates (1999) nor Mackie et al. (2001) report goodness-of-fit data 
for their models this does not imply that this PT model offers a good approximation of their 
survey data nor does it exclude that another set of VTTSPT, λtime and λcost values would offer a 
better fit to these data than the four-quadrant-VTTS model.  
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Figure 3. Mean loss aversion factors from original analyses of Dutch and UK VOT surveys  
 
Figure 4. Linearized indifference map with loss aversion factors according to PT 
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Table 3 VTTSPT, λcost and λtime calculated from VTTS values per quadrant  
 
The λtime value for commuting in Table 3 is similar to that found from the preliminary analyses of 
the first Dutch survey (HCG, 1990, p. 21) but higher than the ‘average’ value (app. 1.8) one might 
infer from Figure 3. For business trips the λtime values are about the same. Particularly for ‘other 
purposes’ Figure 3 exhibits an extreme size effect in λtime, caused by a zero value for small time 
gains and a finite value for small time losses. The model specifications used to arrive at the data 
in Table 3 did not consider such a size effect. The size effect might thus at least partially explain 
the high λtime value of 3.5 found for ‘other purposes’ in Table 3. In view of the large differences in 
model specifications and in the degree of data aggregation that were used to arrive at the data in 
Figure 3 and Table 3 the overall agreement between both sets might be considered as fair. 
Up to now the Dutch 1997 survey has not been analysed for the potential occurrence of loss 
aversion. A first step was to investigate whether loss-neutral utility maximization could explain 
the stated choices of the majority of the respondents. To test this, the 2x12 alternatives submitted 
in the Dutch SP games and the 12 ‘boundary VTTS’ values, that are the values for which each 
alternative in a choice set is equally attractive, were depicted in an indifference map similar to 
Figure 4. Also the percentages of the interviewees that chose each of the 2x12 options were 
categorized and plotted. Figure 5 shows the result for the 1294 car drivers who completed the 
questionnaire for trip durations of 46-90 minutes. From the principles behind this figure it is easy 
to see that at the population level, the median VTTS is equal to the boundary VTTS of a choice set 
if each alternative of that set is chosen by 50% of the interviewees. The median VTTS is higher 
than the boundary VTTS of each choice set for which the percentage that is indicated on the left-
hand side of the concerned boundary line in Figure 5 is lower than 50% and vice versa. The 
opposite holds with respect to the percentages of the right-hand side alternatives. Of course, the 
more these percentages differ from 50%, the more the median VTTS differs from the concerned 
boundary value.  
One should keep in mind that differences in the median VTTS inferred from the frequency of the 
choices from different choice sets cannot be attributed to interpersonal heterogeneity in taste 
templates and/or VTTS as all choice sets were evaluated by the same group of individuals. Of 
course, at the individual level random intrapersonal choice heterogeneity might explain such 
differences but in view of the almost 1300 respondents this effect will largely disappear at the 
population level. Significant differences in feasible VTTS ranges, for example between different 
quadrants in Figure 5, should thus be attributed to the employed choice behaviour strategies. 
Comparing the feasible median VTTS values in the different quadrants of Figure 5 with the 
expected values in agreement with UT and PT will thus reveal whether the majority of the 
considered population chose as if they applied the rules of UT and/or PT. 
 
VTTS values per quadrant (see Table 2)  VTTSPT λcost λtime R2 
From secondary analysis of logit values plot in Bates (1999) 8.1 4.3 2.0 0.905 
From estimate of cost and travel time parameters in Bates (1999) 8.4 3.5 1.9 0.938 
VTTS values for business trips in Mackie et al. (2001a) 12.7 2.4 2.0 0.997 
VTTS values for commuting in Mackie et al. (2001a) 4.4 2.5 3.0 0.999 
VTTS values for other trips in Mackie et al. (2001a) 3.7 2.5 3.5 0.999 
The coefficients of determination R2 follow from linear regression of the VTTS values per quadrant in Table 2 
and the corresponding values calculated from the VTTSPT, λcost and λtime values.  
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 Figure 5 Stated choices of 1997 Dutch car drivers 
 
It appears that both alternatives of SP10 were chosen by 50% of the interviewees. This implies a 
VTTS < €4.3/h in quadrant 4. The 60%-40% distributions of the preferences for the alternatives of 
SP 3 and 4 indicate a VTTS < €8/h and VTTS > €4.8/h. The higher VTTS suggested by the 
response to SP4 compared to SP10 might be a consequence of its greater distance from the ‘zero 
discretionary available money’ axis (see Figure 2). The VTTS in this quadrant would then vary 
between €4/h and €6/h. Figure 5 offers no indication that the ‘status quo’ alternatives of SP3 and 
4 are valued higher than would follow from the trade-off with their feasible alternatives. 
Particularly the low frequency with which the status quo option of SP4 is chosen compared to the 
preference for the time loss-zero cost change alternative of SP10 and the cost gain-zero time 
chance alternative of SP 9 seems incompatible with such a ‘status quo bonus’. 
In quadrant 1 the choice distributions for SP10, 11 and 12 indicate a VTTS above €5/h and far 
below €19/h. Comparison of the frequency of preferences for the different alternatives in 
quadrant 2 does not suggest any ‘status quo bonus’ for the ‘no change’ alternatives of SP 1 and 2. 
Here, the very low preference for the dominated alternative of SP 8 does not come as a surprise. 
However, the preferences between 4% and 17% for the ‘left-hand alternatives’ of SP 1, 2, 5, 6 and 
11 suggest very high VTTS values here. Those for SP 2 indicate a VTTS high above 6.4 €/h. In 
quadrant 3 the 58% preference for the left-hand side alternative of SP7 in connection with the 36% 
preference for that of SP9 indicate a median VTTS of between €9.5/h and €12.5/h. 
According to the diminishing marginal rate of substitution principle of UT the indifference 
curves in Figure 5 should be concave and without a kink at the ‘zero change’ time and money 
levels. As the indifference map is bounded the VTTS will also decrease with increasing travel 
expenses if travel time is kept constant, and increase with increasing travel time if travel expenses 
are kept constant (see Figure 2). The submitted changes in trip times and expenses were between 
10 and 45 % of the interviewees’ reference trip. This implies that the VTTS in quadrant 2 might be 
slightly higher and in quadrant 4 somewhat lower than in the ‘intermediate’ quadrants 1 and 3. 
According to PT the indifference curves should be kinked at the ‘zero change’ time and money 
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axes. The actually inferred median VTTS in quadrant 3 appears about twice as high as in 
quadrant 4 and that in quadrant 1 appears in between those in quadrants 3 and 4. The 
indifference curves are thus clearly kinked at the ‘zero cost change’ attribute level and 
presumably also at the ‘zero time change’ level. This demonstrates that the majority of the 
interviewees did not choose according to the choice behaviour strategy from the UT paradigm. 
The observed differences in median VTTS between quadrants 1, 3 and 4 indicate loss aversion 
factors in the 1.5 to 2.5 range. A majority of the choice statements can therefore be explained by 
assuming that the interviewees followed a choice behaviour strategy congruent with PT. 
Similar maps of the responses for shorter and longer trip durations also indicated loss aversion 
factors above unity. One might conclude that this analysis of the Dutch 1997 data excludes loss 
neutral utility maximization as an explanation for the ‘majority choice pattern’ that the 
interviewees followed. 
The logit analyses, drawing on stochastic interpersonal differences in size independent, loss-
neutral utility maximization, as well as the ‘majority-of-responses’ approach above disregard 
interpersonal heterogeneity in choice behaviour strategies within the survey population. The 
occurrence of such heterogeneity was investigated by assuming that interviewees apply such 
choice behaviour strategies consistently during the successive choices that they make in the SP 
context. Theoretically, the choices from 12 bioptional sets allow 212 = 4096 different sequences. 
After the exclusion of respondents who did not complete all twelve SP questions those of 3949 car 
drivers from the Dutch 1988 and 1997 surveys were evaluated. The considered choice behaviour 
strategies were formulated in terms of a combination of VTTSPT and loss aversion factors for 
travel time and monetary costs. Because this is most commonly used both in UT and PT, only the 
linear additive value decision rule was considered. After assessing the choice sequences that 
follow from application of each strategy the percentage of the respondents with the same choice 
sequence was determined.  
Table 4 Individual choice behaviour strategies of Dutch car drivers 
 
The results of this analysis are tabulated in Table 4. Overall, the distribution of VTTSPT over the 
survey population seems far from random. It appears that the strong lexicographic rule drawing 
on a very high VTTSPT explains the most frequently observed sequence of answers. This sequence 
and the one following from the same rule applied by people with a very low VTTSPT are equally 
well explained by both UT and PT. In addition, UT could explain some 19% more of the 
sequences. With the exception of less than 1% PT could explain these as well. Another 23% of the 
responses violated the principles of UT but could be explained by decision frames and the 
associated loss aversion factors congruent with PT. Though there is some spread in loss aversion 
factors the most commonly mentioned factor 2 applied to both attributes gives the best fit. All 
tabulated combinations of loss aversion factors explained 56% of the observed choice sequences. 
VTTSPT (€/h) < 1 1 - 5 5 - 10 10 - 20 > 20 Total 
Choice behaviour strategy % of respondents 
Strong lexicographic 2 - - - 13 15 
UT (λtime = λcost = 1.0) 2 6 3 10 13 34 
PT (λtime = λcost = 1.5) 2 10 10 12 13 47 
PT (λtime = λcost = 2.0) 2 12 8 17 13 52 
PT (λtime = λcost = 2.5) 2 11 10 4 14 41 
PT (λtime = 2.0; λcost = 1.0) 2 19 3 1 13 38 
Source: individual responses of 3947 car drivers to the SP questions in the 1988 and 1997 Dutch VTTS surveys 
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One should realize that size effects and non-compensatory rules have not yet been analysed. 
Several non-compensatory rules might clarify individual size-dependent valuation and/or draw 
on loss-aversive behaviour. 
To summarize, the majority of the choices made by the UK and Dutch interviewees in these 
surveys can be explained by reference-dependent framing as well as the loss-aversive and size-
dependent valuation of attributes. The sets of VTTS values found by Bates (1999) and Mackie et 
al. (2001a) from aggregated outcomes from the UK survey can be expressed in one VTTSPT and 
two loss aversion factors. This reduction from four to three degrees of freedom hardly affected 
the conformity with the underlying data. The resulting loss aversion factors for travel time 
changes have the same order-of-magnitude as those assessed from a comparison of size-
dependent VTTS values for the time gains and losses as reported by Gunn (2001) from a different 
model estimated for the same UK data. An analysis of the aggregated responses of the Dutch 
1997 SP survey to the separate SP questions violated the principles of UT but the inferred VTTSPT 
and loss aversion factors were in agreement with PT. This analysis definitely did not support a 
higher appraisal of ‘status quo’ alternatives than would follow from a reference-dependent, loss 
aversive choice behaviour strategy. An analysis of the sequences of the choices from the 12 SP 
questions at an individual level, drawing on intrapersonal consistency in individual choice 
behaviour, shows a strong heterogeneity in choice behaviour strategies. It demonstrates that the 
choice sequences of a clear majority of the interviewees in both Dutch surveys can be explained 
by assuming that they behaved according to the principles of PT while only 34% of all choice 
sequences complied with the principles of UT.  
5. Conclusions 
This article considered several behavioural framing and judgment phenomena that might have 
biased the results of the very similar Dutch and UK SP surveys held between 1988 and 1997. This 
yielded the following findings: 
-Hedonic framing and/or the employment of judgment rules related to the availability and cue 
familiarity heuristics might have biased the VTTS of travellers who were reimbursed for their 
trip. In the Dutch surveys the VTTS may have been overestimated by a few percent at the most. 
In future surveys one might arrange for a sample with sufficient numbers of reimbursed and not-
reimbursed travellers in the relevant trip categories to control for such a bias in the VTTS. 
-Though the Dutch SP questionnaires provided a highly accessible anchor, no solid evidence was 
found that the answers were affected by an anchoring bias. Comparison of average VTTS values 
from revealed preference data and from the 1988 survey reported in HCG (1990) shows a pattern 
that might to some extent be explained by such a bias but as the SP values were within the 95% 
confidence interval of the revealed data this does not offer solid proof for it. A bias might also 
have originated because the cost attributes of the choice sets in the Dutch 1988 and 1997 surveys 
had identical nominal levels. It was inferred that an anchoring bias would imply that particularly 
the VTTS for business trips and to a lesser extent for commuting would lag behind inflation. Both 
HCG (1998) and Gunn (2001) provide information, from different analyses of the Dutch SP data, 
that the development of the VTTS for other trips lagged more behind inflation than for business 
trips. 
-Inertia will presumably explain a part of both the non-response to any SP survey and the 
incomplete answering of the SP game. As it is common practice to disregard incomplete records 
and to expand the survey results properly to the population level this will not bias the VTTS 
inferred from stated choice surveys.  
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-An inertia bias may originate in an SP survey if a significant part of the interviewees choose 
‘status quo’ alternatives without trading these with other alternatives to minimize their mental 
effort. In the Dutch surveys at most some 2% to 3% of all respondents systematically chose the 
‘status quo’ alternative from the four SP questions that contained them and also completed the 
other eight SP questions in a way that might be consistent with an inertia bias. This extent is too 
small to exert a more than marginal effect on the VTTS assessment. Also an analysis of the 
aggregated responses to each separate SP question in the Dutch 1997 survey did not support a 
higher appraisal of ‘status quo’ alternatives than of alternatives that imply changes in the 
reference state.  
These findings show that the sign effect as reported from the UK and Dutch SP surveys was not 
caused by an experimentally induced bias. The high frequency of choices for the status quo 
alternatives in the considered SP surveys might thus predominantly be considered as genuine 
expressions of preferences. 
Several secondary analyses were performed to see whether PT would offer a better model for the 
explanation and description of the sign effect than UT. These yielded the following findings: 
-The sets of VTTS values found by Bates (1999) and Mackie et al. (2001a) from aggregated 
outcomes from the UK survey can be expressed in one VTTSPT and two loss aversion factors. The 
reduction from four to three degrees of freedom hardly affected the conformity with the 
underlying data.  
-The resulting loss aversion factors for travel time changes have the same order-of-magnitude as 
those assessed from a comparison of size-dependent VTTS values for time gains and losses, as 
reported by Gunn (2001) from a different model estimated for the same UK data.  
-An analysis of the aggregated responses to the separate SP questions in the Dutch 1997 SP 
survey showed that most respondents violated the principles of UT but the inferred VTTSPT and 
loss aversion factors were in agreement with PT. 
-An analysis of the sequences of the choices from the 12 SP questions at the individual level, 
drawing on intrapersonal consistency in individual choice behaviour, shows a strong 
heterogeneity in choice behaviour strategies. It demonstrates that the choice sequences of a clear 
majority of the interviewees in both Dutch surveys can be explained by assuming that they 
behaved according to the principles of PT while only 34% of all choice sequences complied with 
the principles of UT. 
Summarizing, the VTTS found from the Dutch and UK SP surveys are at most marginally 
affected by hedonic framing, anchoring and inertia biases. The so-called sign effect cannot be 
explained by inertia let alone by an inertia bias. An analysis of the individual choice sequences 
reported from the Dutch surveys shows a strong interpersonal heterogeneity in choice behaviour 
strategies. Only a minority of the responses to the Dutch and UK surveys can be the outcome of a 
consistent application of a choice behaviour strategy as assumed in UT. The majority of the 
responses to these surveys can be explained by assuming reference-dependent framing, loss-
aversive valuation of attributes and a compensatory decision rule in agreement with PT.  
Acknowledgements 
The author wants to thank the Centre for Transport and Navigation of Rijkswaterstaat and 
Significance for providing the original data files of the Dutch VTTS surveys, and Frank Hofman 
and Jan Gerrit Tuinenga for their assistance in interpreting these. He recognizes that this article 
EJTIR 10(4), December 2010, pp. 347-367 
Van de Kaa 
Sign-dependent Value of Time in Stated Preference: Judgment Bias  
or Exposure of Genuine Preference? 
 
 
366 
benefited from reviews of draft versions by Erel Avineri, Bert van Wee and two anonymous 
referees.  
References 
AMR (1999). The Value of Travel Time on UK Roads – 1994. Accent Marketing and Research and 
Hague Consulting Group, The Hague. 
Bates, J. (1999). Value of Travel Times on UK Roads 1994, An Assessment of the HCG/Accent 
Report. In AMR The Value of Travel Time on UK Roads, Accent Marketing and Research and Hague 
Consulting Group, The Hague. 
Burge, P., Rohr, C., Vuk, G. and Bates, J. (2004). Review of international experience in VOT study 
design. Paper presented at the European Transport Conference, Oct. 2004, Strasbourg. 
Cantillo, V. and Ortúzar, J. d. D. (2005). A semi-compensatory discrete choice model with explicit 
attribute thresholds of perception. Transportation Research Part B, vol. 39, no. 7, pp. 641-657. 
De Borger, B. and Fosgerau, M. (2008). The trade-off between money and travel time: A test of the 
theory of reference-dependent preferences. Journal of Urban Economics, vol. 64, pp. 101-115. 
DeSerpa, A. C. (1971). A theory of the economics of time. The Economic Journal, vol. 81, pp. 828-
846. 
Epley, N. and Gilovich, T. (2002). Putting Adjustment Back in the Anchoring and Adjustment 
Heuristic. In Gilovich, T., Griffin, D. and Kahneman, D. (eds) Heuristics and Biases, Cambridge 
University Press, New York. 
Gilovich, T., Griffin, D. and Kahneman, D. (eds.) (2002). Heuristics and Biases. Cambridge 
University Press, New York. 
Gunn, H. (2001). Spatial and temporal transferability of relationships between travel demand, trip 
cost and travel time. Transportation Research Part E, vol. 37, pp. 163-189. 
HCG (1990). The Netherlands’ Value of Time study: Final report. Hague Consulting Group, The 
Hague. 
HCG (1998). Value of Dutch Travel Time Savings in 1997 - Final report, a report for Rijkswaterstaat - 
AVV. Hague Consulting Group, The Hague. 
Hess, S., Rose, J. M. and Hensher, D. A. (2008). Asymmetric preference formation in willingness 
to pay estimates in discrete choice models. Transportation Research Part E: Logistics and 
Transportation Review, vol. 44, no. 5, pp. 847-863. 
Jara-Díaz, S. R. (2002). The Goods/Activities Framework For Discrete Travel Choices: Indirect 
Utility and Value of Time. In Mahmassani, H.S. and IATBR (eds) In Perpetual Motion: Travel 
Behavior Research Opportunities and Application Challenges, Elsevier Science Ltd, Oxford, UK. 
Kahneman, D. (2002). Maps of Bounded Rationality: A Perspective on Intuitive Judgment and 
Choice. In Frängsmyr, T. (ed) Les prix Nobel 2002, Nobel Foundation, Stockholm. 
Kahneman, D. and Frederick, S. (2002). Representativeness revisited: Attribute substitution in 
intuitive judgment. In Gilovich, T., Griffin, D. and Kahneman, D. (eds) Heuristics and Biases, 
Cambridge University Press, New York. 
Kahneman, D. and Tversky, A. (1979). Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision under Risk. 
Econometrica, vol. 47, pp. 263-291. 
EJTIR 10(4), December 2010, pp. 347-367 
Van de Kaa 
Sign-dependent Value of Time in Stated Preference: Judgment Bias  
or Exposure of Genuine Preference? 
 
 
367 
Kahneman, D. and Tversky, A. (1984). Choices, Values, and Frames. American Psychologist, vol. 39, 
pp. 341-350. 
List, J. A. (2004). Neoclassical Theory versus Prospect Theory: Evidence from the Marketplace. 
Econometrica, vol. 72, no. 2, pp. 615-625 
Mackie, P., Fowkes, T., Wardham, M., Whelan, G. and Bates, J. (2001a). Three controversies in the 
valuation of travel time savings. Paper presented at the European Transport Conference, Sept. 2001, 
Cambridge, UK. 
Mackie, P. J., Jara-Díaz, S. and Fowkes, A. S. (2001b). The value of travel time savings in 
evaluation. Transportation Research Part E, vol. 37, pp. 91-106. 
McFadden, D. L. (2001). Economic Choices (revised version of Nobel Prize Lecture). The American 
Economic Review, vol. 91, no. 3, pp. 351-378. 
Metcalfe, J., Schwartz, B. L. and Joaquim, S. G. (1993) The Cue-Familiarity Heuristic in 
Metacognition. Journal of Experimental Psychology, Learning, Memory, and Cognition, vol. 19, pp. 
851-861. 
Payne, J. W., Bettman, J. R. and Johnson, E. J. (1993). The adaptive decision maker. Cambridge 
University Press, New York. 
Rizzi, L. I. and Ortúzar, J. d. D. (2003). Stated preference in the valuation of interurban road 
safety. Accident Analysis and Prevention, vol. 35, pp. 9-22. 
Stanovich, K. E. and West, R. F. (2000). Individual differences in reasoning: Implications for the 
rationality debate? Behavioral and Brain Sciences, vol. 23, pp. 645-726. 
Thaler, R. H. (1980). Toward a positive theory of consumer choice. Journal of Economic Behavior and 
Organization, vol. 1, pp. 39-60. 
Thaler, R. H. (1999). Mental Accounting Matters. Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 
vol. 12, pp. 183-206. 
Thaler, R. H. and Sunstein, C. R. (2009). Nudge, Improving Decisions About Health, Wealth, and 
Happiness, Penguin Books Ltd., London. 
Tversky, A. and Kahneman, D. (1974). Judgment under uncertainty: Heuristics and biases. 
Science, vol. 185, pp. 1124-1131. 
Tversky, A. and Kahneman, D. (1991). Loss aversion in riskless choice: a reference-dependent 
model. The Quarterly Journal of Economics, vol. 106, pp. 1039-1061. 
Tversky, A. and Kahneman, D. (1992). Advances in Prospect Theory: Cumulative Representation 
of Uncertainty. Journal of Risk and Uncertainty, vol. 5, pp. 297-323. 
Van de Kaa, E. J. (2005). Heuristic Judgment, Prospect Theory and Stated Preference Surveys to 
Elicit the Value of Travel Time. Paper presented at the European Transport Conference, Oct. 2005, 
Strasbourg.  
Van de Kaa, E. J. (2008). Extended Prospect Theory. Findings on Choice Behaviour from Economics and 
the Behavioural Sciences and their Relevance for Travel Behaviour. Delft, TRAIL Research School. 
Van de Kaa, E. J. (2010a). Applicability of an Extended Prospect Theory to Travel Behaviour 
Research: A Meta-Analysis. Transport Reviews, DOI: 10.1080/01441647.2010.486907. 
Van de Kaa, E. J. (2010b). Prospect Theory and Choice Behaviour Strategies: Review and 
Synthesis of Concepts from Social and Transport sciences. European Journal of Transport and 
Infrastructure Research, vol. 10, no. 4, pp. 299-329.  
